September 6, 2005
Michigan: Did Board 'Abandon' Parking Area?
CHRISTINE JAKUBOWSKI and JAMES YATES, v MEADOWFIELD CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, ANN EDWARDS, JACKIE MCINTYRE, TERRY POTOK, EVELYN LATKA, and JAN ROSCZEWSKI, LC No. 2003-049960-CZ No. 253169
The Michigan Court of Appeals, in an unpublished decsion, upheld the ruling of a lower court in this case. Plaintiff Jakubowski is the owner of a unit in the Meadowfield Condominium development (“Meadowfield”), and plaintiff Yates resided with Jakubowski. According to plaintiffs, there was an unassigned general common element, i.e., a parking area, east of plaintiff’s unit. Plaintiffs used this parking area for a number of years. In August 2001, plaintiffs received a letter stating that a “no parking” sign was being erected. Plaintiffs, however, continued parking in this area. Eventually, the concrete parking area was removed, and the Meadowfield Board (“Board”) placed boulders in the area to obstruct parking. Plaintiffs filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief.
The trial court concluded that the property in question was not abandoned and dismissed plaintiffs’ complaint. On appeal, plaintiff Jakubowski contends that the trial court erred in granting defendants’ motion for summary disposition. Specifically, plaintiff argues that condominium documents support her claim that the Board abandoned the parking area.
The resolution of this case depends on the construction and interpretation of the Master Deed, which provides that the Condominium Owners Association cannot, without approval of two-thirds of the owners, “seek to abandon, partition, subdivide, encumber, sell or transfer the common elements.” Neither the Master Deed nor the bylaws define the term “abandon.” The trial court relied on Hough v Brown, 104 Mich 109, 112-113; 62 NW 143 (1895), where the Supreme Court defined “abandonment” as “a relinquishment or surrender of rights or property by one person to another; a giving up; a total desertion.” Under this definition, the Board’s action, i.e., converting the parking space into a “grassy” area, did not constitute abandonment because the Board did not relinquish or give up its right or interest in this section of property. Rather, the Board merely changed the character of the property. Plaintiff, however, argues that her right to this property was relinquished when the parking area was destroyed and eliminated. The Michigan Condominium Act provides that the owner of a condominium unit, while he or she may have a fee simple interest, does not have an exclusive interest in the condominium property. MCL 559.101 et seq. Plaintiff did not have an exclusive interest in the parking space. Rather, plaintiff had the right to use the parking space in a manner consistent with the project and in a manner that would not interfere with or impair the rights of any other co-owner. Plaintiff had the same right to this area following the Board’s action of converting the parking space to a “grassy” area, which is the right to use this new area in a manner that would not interfere with or impair the rights of any other co owner. Therefore, we find that the Board’s action did not cause plaintiff’s right in this property to be relinquished. Thus, the trial court did not err in concluding that the property in question was not abandoned.
Posted by joewest at 5:21 PM